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Abstract
Based on two strands of research, namely ‘barriers to technology adop-
tion’ and ‘appropriate technology’, we propose a formal reappraisal of
‘deep integration’, a broad concept often used in trade policy discussions.
We then evaluate the 2004-7 EU enlargement wave utilizing this opera-
tional reappraisal. More specifically, we first estimate, using 2007 data,
total labor productivity (TLP) in the 27 EU member states, and show that
in all but a few sectors, new member states clearly stand below the lower
envelope technology frontier of the older members in their use of skilled
and unskilled labor. We interpret this as being the result of past barriers
to technology adoption that are likely to be removed by the integration
process into the EU, with these new counties’ TLP shifting to the incum-
bent members’ lower envelope. We then explore the potential effects on
all 27 EU member states of this ‘deep integration’ experiment using a cal-
ibrated intertemporal multisectoral general equilibrium model. Our main
finding is that, for most parameter configurations, workers’ welfare in in-
cumbent member countries is not negatively impacted despite the rather
drastic improvement in competitiveness experienced by new members.
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1 Introduction
The literature on cross-country economic performance has now accumulated am-
ple evidence to document large gaps in technology usage. Hence, the widespread
and often implicit view that countries have access to the same technology, with
differences in input combinations reflecting differences in factor prices only, is
clearly over simplistic. Among the different theories that have been proposed to
nuance this view, two important strands of literature single out as particularly
appealing. The first highlights differences in productivity levels, acknowledges
the existence of barriers to technology adoption, and identifies a large vari-
ety of factors that contribute to reduce adoption abilities and efficient use of
knowledge in production. Among the important contributions to this ‘barri-
ers to technology adoption’ literature, Parente and Prescott (1994, 2000) em-
phasize restrictions to foreign trade and limited access to international capital
markets, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) highlight the role of political and in-
stitutional organization, Alesina, Battisti, and Zeira (2015) single out the role
of labor market regulations, Comin and Hobijn (2004) underline differences in
factor endowments and Ferraro (2017) argues that volatility is a contributing
factor. The importance of factor endowments and complementarities in cross-
country technology diffusion are also emphasized by the related ‘appropriate
–or endogenous– technology’ literature. Based on the seminal work of Atkin-
son and Stiglitz (1969), influential papers include, among others, Diwan and
Rodrik (1991), Basu and Weil (1998), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), Caselli
and Coleman (2006) and Vandenbussche, Aghion, and Meghir (2006). One key
implication of this literature is the existence of an efficiency frontier, rather than
a single ‘state-of-the-art’ production function; by making technological choices
endogenous, it emphasizes that differences in factor endowments will induce
countries to pick optimally different technologies on their frontiers.
A third strand of research has independently developed in the trade litera-
ture around the concept of ‘deep integration’ (Lawrence, 1996). This concept,
has become widely used in policy discussions on trade and more recently on
‘new regionalism’, with EU integration serving as the most vivid example (see
e.g. Ethier, 1998; Baldwin, 1997). The literature on ‘deep integration’ refers to
an extremely broad –and hence somewhat vague– state of integration between
economies, inclusive but indeed much broader than what can be achieved by the
elimination of standard barriers to trade in goods and to capital flows.1 Such
integration requires, amongst others, “disciplines such as infrastructure, insti-
tutions, competition policy, the standardization and harmonization of product
regulations (Orefice and Rocha 2011, p.2).2 This attractive concept of inte-
gration involves dimensions that are clearly beyond the scope of trade, and it
can therefore hardly be surprising that “the empirical literature on the rela-
tionship between trade and deep integration is very limited. One of the main
1The latter more restrictive definition of integration is in contrast referred to as ‘shallow
integration’.
2See also Birdsall and Lawrence (1999), Rodrik (2002) and Gasiorek and Holmes (2008).
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reasons for this derives from the difficulties that arise when defining and mea-
suring the depth of an agreement.” (Orefice and Rocha 2011, p.3).3 Lack of
an implementable definition of deep integration is in particular problematic for
quantitative evaluations of successive European enlargements.
It should be apparent from the discussions in the previous paragraphs that
the process of deep integration refers to disciplines that are related to those
necessary to achieve efficient diffusion of knowledge in production. Building on
the ‘barriers to technology adoption’ literature, and drawing on ‘appropriate
technology’, our first contribution in this paper is to propose an alternative
interpretation of deep integration that can be used in counterfactual policy
exercises. We show how our reformulation of the concept can be converted into
a quantifiable technological shock immediately implementable into numerical
models to deliver quantitative policy evaluations.
Our formalized definition of deep integration is especially relevant to the
context of Europe’s enlargement process. The enlargement episode of 2004-7,
in particular, involved simultaneous integration of a large set of countries of
which some have populations of significant sizes;4 the shock is therefore likely
to have non trivial indirect effects, in particular on factor prices in incumbent
member states. Can we be confident that such a shock will not redistribute
welfare at the expense of labor –and in particular of the lower-skilled workers– in
older member states? In the current context of widespread anti-EU resentment
and of rising populism that threaten the future of the European integration
project, understanding these effects and assessing their potential magnitudes is
an important task for economists. Our second contribution in this paper is to
shed light on those issues by implementing our definition of deep integration
in a calibrated general equilibrium (GE) model of the EU in order to assess
the potential consequences of the 2004-7 enlargement wave. The model is a
two-period (short vs long term) intertemporal (agents make optimal savings
decisions under perfect foresight) multi-country (each of the twenty-seven EU
national economies) and multi-sectoral (we distinguish ten different industries,
some of which are characterized by monopolistic competition) set-up calibrated
on 2007 data. It is a dynamic highly sophisticated version of the so-called
‘footloose capital with vertical linkages’ model of the new economic geography
literature (see e.g. Baldwin et al, 2003). Even though we do solve the model
for the long run equilibrium geographical location of the firms, our interest is
3Within this framework, examples for quantifiable evaluations of the concept mostly rely on
constructed depth indicators, based on the content of (preferential) trade agreements (Horn,
Mavroidis, and Sapir 2010). Models used for the analysis of the consequences of ‘integration’
on the other hand, often take (exogenously) increased factor mobility along with lower trade
costs as indicators of ‘increased regional integration’ (Ludema and Wooton 2000).
4The ‘fifth wave’ enlargement of the EU involved: Cyprus (CYP), the Czech Repub-
lic (CZE), Estonia (EST), Latvia (LVA), Lithuania (LTU), Hungary (HUN), Malta (MLT),
Poland (POL), Slovakia (SVK) and Slovenia (SVN) in 2004; with Bulgaria (BGR) and Ro-
mania (ROU) in 2007. Throughout this paper, we shall refer to these counties somewhat
loosely as the ‘new’ member states of the EU, as opposed to the ‘old’ member states, which
are Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Germany (DEU), Denmark (DNK), Spain (ESP), Fin-
land (FIN), France (FRA), Great Britain (GBR), Greece (GRC), Ireland (IRL), Italy (ITA),
Luxembourg (LUX), the Netherlands (NLD), Portugal (PRT) and Sweden (SWE).
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not on changing trade costs, which we assume negligible.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we apply the cross-section re-
gression methodology of Caselli and Coleman (2006)5 on EU country data from
year 2007. We first estimate, at sectorial level, the country specific technology
frontiers jointly with the optimal location choice on this frontier, conditional on
national endowments of skilled and unskilled labor (the appropriate technology
choice). We document a clear pattern of systematic efficiency gaps between
older member states and those that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. We then
generate, for each sector, a lower envelope to incumbent EU members’ technol-
ogy frontiers and compute the gap in total labor productivity (hereafter TLP)
between each new member state and this lower envelope frontier. We interpret
this as providing a measure of the efficiency losses caused by pre-membership
barriers to technology adoption due to the various factors identified by the lit-
erature. Section 3 elaborates our reinterpretation of ‘deep integration’: because
joining the EU involves a wide range of economic, political and institutional
reforms to harmonize institutions, policies, standards etc., the conjecture here
is that integration with the EU will induce a technological catch-up in the form
of an upward shift in TLP that will place new members on the lower envelope
frontier of the incumbent-member states. This shift in TLP defines the deep
integration shock in our framework, to be implemented into the calibrated GE
model of the EU described in Section 4. In the same section, we also report and
discuss the numerical results of the deep integration shock. Section 5 offers a
brief conclusion.
2 Measuring country specific technology fron-
tiers within the EU
2.1 The econometric methodology
We follow CC (2006):6 consider aggregate firms combining skilled and unskilled
labor using a CES technology which we write as:
Lab = θ
[
[AunLun]
−ρ
+ [AskLsk]
−ρ
]−1/ρ
; (1)
here, Lun and Lsk denote labor inputs indexed by skill levels with Aun, Ask
the associated parameters that convert the raw quantities into efficiency units,
ρ is the parameter that characterizes substitutability (with σLab = 1/(1 +
ρ) the substitution elasticity), θ is a shift parameter (initially set to unity)
measuring TLP. Parameters Aun, Ask are allowed to vary across countries. They
are interpreted as resulting from endogenous ‘appropriate’ technology choices
from a menu of different production methods on a country specific technology
5Hereafter CC (2006).
6We however use a different notation. The reader is in particular cautioned on the fact
that, in their paper, σ does not refer to a substitution elasticity.
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frontier, by firms facing different factor endowments and levels of technology
adoption. The econometric procedure proposed by CC (2006) makes it possible
to simultaneously estimate, from a cross-section of country data set, country
specific parameters γ and B from a technological frontier of the form:
Aωun + γA
ω
sk ≤ B (2)
and each country’s optimal location (parameters Aun and Ask) on its frontier,
conditional on a common estimated curvature parameter ω and an ex-ante cho-
sen value of the substitution elasticity σLab. The equation resulting from the
constrained optimal technology choice that is to be estimated takes the following
form:
log(
Aisk
Aiun
) =
1
ω + ρ
logγi +
−ρ
ω + ρ
log
(
Lisk
Liun
)
(3)
where i is the country index. The estimate of −ρω+ρ can be obtained from the
regression coefficient. Utilizing this estimate and the chosen value of σLab, one
can infer the value of ω. The trade-off parameter γi, can then be recovered
for each country from regression residuals. Equation (2) then, backs-out each
country’s Bi, hence the country-specific technology frontier. All estimated pa-
rameters from equation (3) have to be positive.7 Differences in the estimated
values of the Bi parameters clearly provide a measure of the technology gap
that exists between countries at a specific date.
Aggregate country data may cover important sectoral differences (among
which, the type of competition prevailing), which we do not want to neglect: we
therefore depart from CC (2006) by adapting their methodology to a multisector
setup. This essentially requires a sector-level definition of factor endowments.
Imperfect as it is, we make the assumption that intersectoral mobility of labor
is low enough for actual employment in a sector to be a reasonably good proxy
for factor endowments as perceived by an individual firm in the same sector.
The aggregate economy is partitioned through out this paper into the fol-
lowing ten sectors of activity: Primary; Food, Beverages and Tobacco; Textiles
and Textile Production; Chemicals and Plastics; Basic and Fabricated Metals;
Electrical and Optical Equipment; Transport Equipment; Construction; Other
Manufacturing; and Services.
2.2 Estimation results
To be able to apply this econometric methodology, we first have to generate,
for all EU member countries and for each sector, the values of the efficiency pa-
rameters Aun and Ask. For this, we use the FOC of the maximization problem
of the representative firm so that the inputs to production from our data set
7The restriction for unique interior equilibrium, where all firms within a country choose
the same technology (Aun, Ask) and the same factor ratios (Lun/Lsk) is ω > −ρ/(1 +ρ). See
CC (2006) for details.
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are fully consistent with the output and skill-premium in each country/sector.8
Though numbers do differ across sectors –in some cases significantly– a com-
mon pattern clearly emerges as Figure 1 illustrates at the aggregate level. We
see that old EU-member countries tend to be concentrated on the upper-right,
revealing rather similar levels of absolute technological efficiency. As is no sur-
prise, within this group of countries, the German economy stands out with a
relatively skill-biased technology, suggesting higher levels of skill abundance.
In contrast, firms in the Mediterranean countries tend to make more unskilled
labor-intensive technology choices consistent with relatively high unskilled la-
bor abundance. In sharp contrast, new member countries display much higher
heterogeneity in their technology choices, in terms of both relative and absolute
factor efficiencies. Among these, three groups distinctly emerge: the first group,
with Slovakia as an extreme, reveals highly skill-biased labor technology choices
reflecting relatively abundant skilled labor endowments. At the other extreme
are Bulgaria and Romania, both economies characterized by low levels of skilled
labor. In between these groups are Cyprus and Slovenia which not only differ
by their more balanced labor technology choices but also by higher levels of
absolute total labor efficiency.
Figure 1: Efficiency of skilled and unskilled workers - aggregate economy, 2007
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Our next step is to use these efficiency parameters (Aun and Ask) in cross-EU
country regressions (equation (3)) in order to back-out each country’s techno-
logical frontier (equation (2)). We perform these regressions for each sector,
conditional on a common, ex-ante specified, value of σLab = 1.4 that is gener-
8For this step, we complement the detailed set of social accounting matrices for year 2007,
constructed by A´lvarez-Mart´ınez and Lo´pez-Cobo (2016) with sectoral data on skilled and un-
skilled employment and the corresponding wage rates from the World Input Output Database
(WIOD) (Dietzenbacher et al, 2013).
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ally adopted as a reasonable benchmark value.9 The resulting parameter values
that define the country and sector specific technology frontiers are reported in
Table 1.10 Across the sectors displayed on the table, the Bs obtained for the
old member states are, on average, 75% higher than those of the new members,
and also show 33.6% lower variability, indicating relatively homogeneous tech-
nology choice sets for the old members. Also note that for the core group of the
old members (that is, excluding the Mediterranean countries), the technology
choices (Ask/Aun)s are also comparable. The (relative) variabilities of the Bs
and of the efficiency ratios, are much higher for the new members.
It is illuminating to compute, for each sector, the upper and lower envelopes
of the technology frontiers of the old member states: to conserve on space, we
only display in Figure 2 the resulting graphs for a subset of sectors. Not sur-
prisingly, Germany lies on the upper envelope in sectors including ‘electrical
and optical equipments’ and ‘transport equipments’, Great Britain outperforms
others in ‘food, beverages and tobacco’, ‘textiles and metal products’, and Lux-
embourg in ‘services’. Not surprisingly either, Greece and Portugal generally
lag behind, being either on, or very close to, the lower envelope in all sectors.
Worth mentioning is the position of Spain that performs almost as well as Italy
in most sectors.
In Figure 3, we report (for the same selected sectors as in Figure 2) the ef-
ficiency position of the new EU-member states relative to the lower technology
envelope of the older member countries. All the new member states are signifi-
cantly below this frontier in all but a few sectors, with the exception of Slovenia
and, to a lesser extent, Cyprus, as the graphs clearly illustrate. Note that in
these graphs, the axes report logs. To give a better idea of the magnitude of the
technology gap involved, we can compute the values of the shift parameters θ
in equation (1) that would be necessary, everything else equal, to place the new
member states on the lower envelope in each sector of activity. These numbers
are reported in Table 2.
9We have explored the sensitivity of the estimated results with respect to the common
value of σLab –using values between 1.1 and 2.0– : absolute numbers obviously change, but
the relative position turns out to be quite stable, except for Malta.
10It can be checked that for all sectors except Primary the estimated values of ω satisfy the
symmetry condition (see CC (2006)) that ω > −ρ/(1 + ρ)) for σLab = 1.4 which guarantees
interior solutions with positive efficiency parameters. For Primary, the estimate of ω slightly
falls short of the condition for a range of σLab values chosen on both sides of 1.4; for σLab = 1.4,
ωˆ = 0.3965 < 0.4.
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Table 1: Estimated parameters for country/sector specific technology frontiers, 2007
log(A sk /A un ) γ B log(A sk /A un ) γ B log(A sk /A un ) γ B log(A sk /A un ) γ B log(A sk /A un ) γ B log(A sk /A un ) γ B log(A sk /A un ) γ B log(A sk /A un ) γ B log(A sk /A un ) γ B log(A sk /A un ) γ B
Old Members
AUT 2.24 0.954 2.52 2.81 0.913 3.24 2.81 0.913 3.23 2.81 0.913 3.66 2.81 0.913 3.58 2.81 0.910 3.74 2.81 0.913 3.85 2.68 0.915 3.25 2.81 0.913 3.52 3.32 0.939 3.45
BEL 0.83 1.071 3.22 1.57 1.056 4.14 1.57 1.056 3.95 1.57 1.056 4.89 1.57 1.056 4.32 1.57 1.053 4.50 1.57 1.056 4.70 0.84 1.058 3.98 1.57 1.056 4.34 2.32 1.067 4.24
DEU 2.60 0.987 2.91 3.17 0.875 2.98 3.17 0.875 3.24 3.17 0.875 3.87 3.17 0.875 3.55 3.17 0.873 3.90 3.17 0.875 4.36 3.17 0.864 2.94 3.17 0.875 3.53 3.47 0.945 3.39
DNK 1.07 1.011 3.23 1.49 1.034 4.18 1.49 1.034 4.02 1.49 1.034 4.54 1.49 1.034 4.06 1.49 1.031 4.37 1.49 1.034 4.23 1.69 0.988 3.97 1.49 1.034 4.20 2.22 1.044 4.11
ESP -0.20 0.980 2.31 0.82 1.030 3.16 0.82 1.030 2.88 0.82 1.030 3.76 0.82 1.030 3.39 0.82 1.026 3.42 0.82 1.030 3.52 -0.16 1.030 3.11 0.82 1.030 3.31 1.80 1.009 3.29
FIN 1.34 1.075 2.91 2.00 1.066 3.95 2.00 1.066 3.62 2.00 1.066 4.19 2.00 1.066 4.01 2.00 1.062 4.36 2.00 1.066 4.04 1.38 1.066 3.76 2.00 1.066 4.13 2.48 1.098 3.86
FRA 1.20 1.063 3.15 1.87 1.006 3.65 1.87 1.006 3.65 1.87 1.006 4.54 1.87 1.006 3.94 1.87 1.003 4.23 1.87 1.006 4.28 1.26 1.007 3.56 1.87 1.006 3.98 2.14 1.060 4.09
GBR 2.16 0.916 3.12 2.21 0.952 4.25 2.21 0.952 4.25 2.21 0.952 4.25 2.21 0.952 4.25 2.21 0.949 4.23 2.21 0.952 4.25 1.75 0.993 3.91 2.21 0.952 4.25 2.44 1.047 3.82
GRC -0.47 0.966 2.31 0.68 1.084 2.68 0.68 1.084 2.35 0.68 1.084 2.80 0.68 1.084 2.94 0.68 1.080 2.86 0.68 1.084 2.98 -0.42 1.083 2.43 0.68 1.084 2.68 2.23 1.040 2.89
IRL 0.11 1.057 2.93 1.73 1.048 3.52 1.73 1.048 3.24 1.73 1.048 3.93 1.73 1.048 3.38 1.73 1.044 3.65 1.73 1.048 3.57 0.81 1.067 3.96 1.73 1.048 3.63 2.74 0.988 3.68
ITA 0.35 0.916 2.47 0.79 1.043 3.50 0.79 1.043 3.24 0.79 1.043 3.91 0.79 1.043 3.49 0.79 1.039 3.66 0.79 1.043 3.75 -0.13 1.029 3.15 0.79 1.043 3.55 1.76 1.040 3.52
LUX 0.74 1.021 3.24 1.50 1.003 3.35 1.50 1.003 3.75 1.50 1.003 4.01 1.50 1.003 4.22 1.50 0.999 3.79 1.50 1.003 3.35 -0.14 1.030 3.47 1.50 1.003 4.03 2.49 0.978 4.13
NLD 1.30 0.994 3.41 1.64 0.990 4.01 1.64 0.990 3.79 1.64 0.990 4.34 1.64 0.990 3.92 1.34 1.075 4.09 1.64 0.990 3.97 1.17 1.009 3.92 1.64 0.990 3.80 2.46 1.012 3.89
PRT -3.10 1.031 1.96 -0.22 0.947 2.36 -0.22 0.947 2.06 -0.22 0.947 2.83 -0.22 0.947 2.38 -0.22 0.943 2.88 -0.22 0.947 2.75 -0.95 0.932 2.24 -0.22 0.947 2.43 1.35 0.923 2.70
SWE 1.17 1.088 3.33 1.80 1.087 3.93 1.80 1.087 3.84 1.80 1.087 4.41 1.80 1.087 3.95 1.80 1.083 4.52 1.80 1.087 4.23 1.49 1.089 3.98 1.80 1.087 4.12 2.48 1.134 4.20
New Members
BGR -2.55 0.957 1.15 -0.22 0.947 1.24 -0.22 0.947 1.13 -0.22 0.947 1.36 -0.22 0.947 1.45 -0.22 0.943 1.39 -0.22 0.947 1.55 -0.95 0.932 1.22 -0.22 0.947 1.34 1.12 0.968 1.43
CYP 0.31 1.026 2.01 0.89 1.089 2.50 0.89 1.089 2.14 0.89 1.089 2.63 0.89 1.089 2.85 0.89 1.085 2.79 0.89 1.089 2.81 0.49 1.079 2.82 0.89 1.089 2.95 3.34 0.918 2.74
CZE 3.14 1.000 1.94 3.32 0.989 2.00 3.32 0.989 1.80 3.32 0.989 2.17 3.32 0.989 2.12 3.32 0.986 2.11 3.32 0.989 2.29 3.81 0.987 1.97 3.32 0.989 2.08 4.36 1.004 2.23
EST 2.77 0.985 1.84 2.14 1.099 2.20 2.14 1.099 1.75 2.14 1.099 2.23 2.14 1.099 2.14 2.14 1.096 2.47 2.14 1.099 2.15 1.68 1.082 2.14 2.14 1.099 2.30 3.95 1.018 2.24
HUN 1.94 0.988 1.71 2.71 0.938 1.78 2.71 0.938 1.38 2.71 0.938 2.14 2.71 0.938 1.88 2.71 0.935 1.87 2.71 0.938 2.12 2.49 0.988 1.67 2.71 0.938 1.93 3.85 0.971 2.18
LTU 2.05 1.006 1.64 2.49 1.110 1.95 2.49 1.110 1.69 2.49 1.110 2.36 2.49 1.110 2.45 2.49 1.107 2.26 2.49 1.110 2.25 2.25 1.077 2.06 2.49 1.110 2.12 4.03 1.082 2.08
LVA 1.38 1.037 2.47 2.32 1.021 1.86 2.32 1.021 1.66 2.32 1.021 2.14 2.32 1.021 2.06 2.32 1.018 1.92 2.32 1.021 2.10 1.64 1.060 2.48 2.32 1.021 1.90 3.72 1.003 2.09
MLT -2.53 0.975 1.78 -0.22 0.947 2.67 -0.22 0.947 2.45 -0.22 0.947 2.05 -0.22 0.947 2.73 -0.22 0.943 2.49 -0.22 0.947 6.05 -0.95 0.932 1.94 -0.22 0.947 2.61 1.25 0.948 2.53
POL 2.28 0.957 1.94 3.63 0.930 1.77 3.63 0.930 1.28 3.63 0.930 2.06 3.63 0.930 1.71 3.63 0.928 1.90 3.63 0.930 1.72 3.09 0.922 1.71 3.63 0.930 1.77 4.87 0.944 1.95
ROU -3.02 1.022 1.77 -0.22 0.947 1.99 -0.22 0.947 1.38 -0.22 0.947 1.98 -0.22 0.947 1.75 -0.22 0.943 1.48 -0.22 0.947 1.68 -0.95 0.932 1.61 -0.22 0.947 1.73 1.07 0.973 1.80
SVK 3.36 0.966 1.67 4.09 0.927 1.72 4.09 0.927 1.49 4.09 0.927 1.82 4.09 0.927 2.01 4.09 0.925 1.67 4.09 0.927 1.91 4.02 0.949 1.75 4.09 0.927 1.75 5.09 0.946 1.80
SVN 1.16 0.976 2.53 2.35 0.979 2.57 2.35 0.979 2.22 2.35 0.979 2.96 2.35 0.979 2.58 2.35 0.976 2.61 2.35 0.979 2.63 2.48 0.954 2.40 2.35 0.979 2.56 4.40 0.943 2.71
ω 0.3965 0.4101 0.4101 0.4101 0.4101 0.4100 0.4101 0.4054 0.4101 0.4027
 Construction Other Manufacturing ServicesPrimary
Food, Beverages and 
Tobacco Textiles and Textile Prod.  Chemicals and Plastics
Basic and Fabricated 
Metals Electrical and Optical Equip. Transport Equip.
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Figure 2: Lower and upper envelopes of old members’ technology frontiers, selected sectors, 2007
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Figure 3: Technology gap between new members and lower envelope of old members, selected sectors, 2007
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Table 2: Computed θ-values for new members to reach the lower envelope tech-
nology frontier of incumbent members, 2007
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Other    
Man. 
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BGR          
CYP          
CZE          
EST          
HUN          
LTU          
LVA          
MLT          
POL          
ROU          
SVK          
SVN          
 
3 On EU enlargement: a reinterpretation
The previous section has documented the existence of quite systematic tech-
nology differences between old and new EU member countries in 2007. Part
of these differences reflect differences in factor endowments, as suggested by
the ‘appropriate-technology’ literature. However, other explanations have to be
provided for such strong differences in efficiency: the results clearly suggest ex-
istence of significant barriers to technology adoption in the recent past. Indeed,
20th century history, and the fact that most –all except Cyprus and Malta–
of the new member states under consideration were part of the Soviet bloc,
favor an explanation based on restrictions to foreign trade and international
capital, as well as to institutions not too favorably inclined towards competitive
innovations or to regulations that restrict foreign access, that is, to all factors
that limit adoption of better technologies. If that is indeed the case, then one
should expect that, for those economies, joining the EU will not only mean
removal of the barriers to trade, but also elimination of restrictions to capital
flows, harmonization of legislation and regulations regarding intellectual prop-
erty rights, international competition policy, product standards etc., leading to
deeper integration.
Therefore, joining the EU, will not only induce the type of reallocations
predicted, conditional on given technologies, by standard trade theory, but also
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–and indeed possibly more importantly– it is likely to induce technological catch-
up. To make this definition of ‘deep integration’ a workable concept, we still
need to quantify the technology gap that can be attributed to previous barriers
to technology adoption. The econometric results of the previous section pro-
vide a rather natural –and arguably conservative– candidate measure for this
gap: the country’s efficiency position relative to the lower technology envelope
of incumbent member states. We attribute to the past barriers to technology
adoption the responsibility for the new members’ position below the lower enve-
lope technology frontier of incumbent member states. Hence, by removing these
barriers, integration within the EU should induce a shift of the TLP parameters
θ so as to place the new member states on this lower envelope. The amplitude
of the shift involved is precisely what has been reported in Table 2.
Such a shock would have, if not limited interest, at least predictable conse-
quences if it were experienced by a single country. In contrast, experienced by all
new EU members simultaneously, it is likely to have non trivial indirect effects
on incumbent member states, in particular on factor-income distribution, and
more specifically on wages. These effects have of course never been evaluated:
in the remainder of this paper, we shall provide a quantitative exploration of
these issues by use of a calibrated GE model of production, trade, and growth.
4 Measuring EU enlargement: deep integration
4.1 The numerical methodology
We provide in this section a non-technical description of the main features of
the numerical methodology, and relegate to Appendix B a detailed presentation
of the equations of the GE model.
The year chosen for model calibration purposes is of course the same as the
one used in our econometric estimations, 2007.11 The choice of an appropriate
base year is both important and difficult, particularly so, when the model is
dynamic and calibration assumes a steady state. We choose year 2007 for the
following reasons. 2007 is three years after the most important enlargement
vague of the Union, with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joining in: hence, we can
reasonably assume that the standard direct reallocation effects of the removal of
trade costs and restrictions (the effects of shallow integration) are already essen-
tially reflected in the data for these countries. 2007 is also the year Bulgaria and
Romania have formally joined the Union: even though most trade barriers have
likely been de facto removed prior to that date, picking a base year a few years
later would seem to have been better (in particular, more consistent with our
assumption of negligible trade costs). However, 2007 is also prior to a decade
11We make use of detailed social accounting matrices for year 2007 based on A´lvarez-
Mart´ınez and Lo´pez-Cobo (2016), marginally complemented by WIOD data on employment
and wages.
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of severe recession, any year of which would clearly fail to qualify as a proper
candidate for an approximate steady state equilibrium. For these reasons, year
2007 appears to be the most recent best compromise for our purpose.
The model is infinite horizon intertemporal, time-aggregated into two peri-
ods, a short term (t1) and a long term (t2), separated by a span of 30 years
after which steady-state is imposed.12 We are interested in deviations w.r.t. a
reference path, and therefore abstract from exogenous trends.
The model includes the 27 member states of the European Union in 2007; all
countries have identical structures; the model is closed by a ‘rest-of-the-world’
(here after RoW ) that is kept exogenous except for the volume of its bilateral
trade which is price responsive. The RoW prices serve as numeraire.
In each country, all national households are aggregated into a single repre-
sentative agent endowed with constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution
preferences (with substitution elasticity parameter denoted σ). The agent is
also endowed with two types of labor, skilled and unskilled, that she allocates
endogenously, within the country, to different sectors of activity in response to
wage differentials. Intersectoral reallocations are very limited in the short run
but made significantly easier in the second period. Households also own assets
in the form of bonds and claims on physical capital, the latter of which they
accumulate by endogenous savings decisions made by lifetime utility maximiza-
tion, with consumption smoothing on the basis of the returns expected to be
reaped from future capital ownership. Aggregate household consumption is –as
are all other components of the demands for goods– allocated to different in-
dustries using optimal demand systems derived from multi-level CES (including
possibly Dixit-Stiglitz sub-nests).
On the production side, we distinguish between ten broad sectors of ac-
tivities. For a subset of these industries (namely, Primary; Other Manufac-
turing; and Services) we assume perfect competition with firms making use of
constant returns to scale (hereafter CRS) production functions to produce ho-
mogeneous goods; the technology combines intermediate goods and production
factors –capital, skilled and unskilled labor– through nested-CES structures.
The remaining industries (namely Food, Beverages and Tobacco; Textiles and
Textile Production; Chemicals and Plastics; Basic and Fabricated Metals; Elec-
trical and Optical Equipment; Transport Equipment; Construction) may either
be treated similarly, or assumed to be populated by symmetric (within national
boundaries) producers operating increasing returns to scale (hereafter IRS) tech-
nologies to produce differentiated varieties within Nash games in prices (i.e.,
monopolistic competition) with long-run zero profits ensured by free entry/exit.
In these monopolistically competitive sectors, the individual firm faces a fixed
production cost –which we assume in the form of a real amount of foregone
output– which adds to its variable costs determined from a nested-CES struc-
ture identical to the one used in CRS sectors. Of particular interest in this
nested structure is the value added, produced by a CES technology combining
capital and aggregate composite labor, the latter factor itself resulting from a
12On time aggregation issues in intertemporal models, see Mercenier and Michel (1994).
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CES aggregation of skilled and unskilled labor as displayed in equation (1): this
is of course where the technological upgrading shock is imposed in t2.
The public sector is present in the model for base year replication purposes,
but assumptions are made to keep its behavior as neutral as possible (in partic-
ular, the stock of public bonds is kept constant with public consumption defined
residually).
Importantly, the model has to capture two characteristic features of modern
capital: first, extremely mobile financial capital should erase systematic dif-
ferences in rates of return expected on capital by households within the EU.
Second, in spite of this, the capital rental cost, for firms, is far from being
equalized across countries. We capture these features by pooling all the phys-
ical capital of EU households into a single stock –this ensures that all capital
owners earn the same rental price for their physical assets. The aggregate stock
is then optimally allocated (by maximizing the rental revenues of the pooled
capital) to each country within the Union, and to each sector within each coun-
try, subject to a two-level nested Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET)
constraint.13 The values of the transformation elasticities govern the concavities
of the allocation frontiers, and therefore provide a convenient characterization
of how mobile physical capital is, both internationally (the upper-level CET,
with elasticity denoted σKE27), and intersectorally (the lower level CET, with
elasticity denoted σKi ). Yet, calibration of the CETs on base year data ensures
that the simulated counterfactual equilibrium allocation remains anchored to its
initial geographical distribution. By adopting different values in time (that is at
t1 and t2) for σ
K
E27 and σ
K
i , we capture the fact that physical capital mobility in
the long run exceeds substantially that of the short term, both internationally
and intersectorally. Pooling all claims on physical capital into a single Euro-
pean stock also obviously requires pooling investment –a common unit cost of
investment is in particular necessary for all capital owners to expect the same
rate of return on their physical assets throughout Europe– which imposes some
constraints on the modeling of investment: see Appendix B for details.
Each country’s aggregate demand for an industry’s goods is then converted
into a trade matrix (with non-zero diagonal elements) using a CES allocation
structure: the assumptions made are therefore, a single-level Armington scheme
for CRS sectors, and a standard Dixit-Stiglitz structure for monopolistically
competitive sectors.
The model is closed by imposing that supplies and demands balance on all
markets. (Alternatively, we make labor supply endogenous by use of a reduced
form wage curve.) With budget constraints imposed for all European agents, it
is also satisfied for the RoW by Walras’ law: we check that this is indeed the
case. The welfare index we report, ψi, is defined as equivalent variation: see
Appendix B.
The calibration of the model is made conditional on chosen values for a set
of parameters, most of which are substitution/transformation elasticities: the
13When reading the results, one should therefore keep in mind that there is no simple link
between capital ownership by national households and the amount of capital services in a
country’s GDP.
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values adopted are reported in Appendix C, and are essentially borrowed from
Mercenier et al. (2016).
Once the model is calibrated, it can be used to simulate the induced effects
of the deep integration shock. This involves computing the new equilibrium
allocation and price system consistent with the new exogenous values of the
total-labor-productivity shift parameters θ reported in Table 2. Because the
technological catch-up will take time to materialize, we impose this exogenous
shift in TLP at time t2 only.
Readers familiar with the new economic geography literature will have noted
that we assume no international labor mobility. The reason for this is that we
want to limit the risk of equilibrium multiplicity that (as we know from Krug-
man, 1991; Krugman and Venables, 1995 and others) generically characterize
general equilibrium structures with monopolistic competition and endogenous
geographical location of firms. Indeed, in absence of a numerical procedure
to identify all possible equilibrium configurations, as well as of a theoretically
sound mechanism to pick the ‘most appropriate’ among those possible outcomes,
the risk is that the selection be arbitrarily made by a numerical algorithm (see
Mercenier, 1995 for such a numerical illustration). By assuming no international
mobility of labor we implicitly restrict our numerical search to a neighborhood
of the initial (real world) equilibrium configuration on which the model is cali-
brated, a sound strategy.14
4.2 Simulation results
4.2.1 New member states
In the new member states, the mechanisms at work are quite straightforward
to anticipate. In addition to boosting the new members’ long-term competi-
tiveness, the positive shock on future TLP will cause relative scarcity of capital
in these economies, which will push the long-term rental price of capital up-
wards. This not only will tilt the optimal time profile of private consumption at
the expense of short term levels as households substitute intertemporally, but
also shift upwards their wealth constraint. Furthermore, attracted by extremely
profitable returns, physical capital will flow massively from older to new mem-
ber states in the long term (t2) which will contribute to push further up the
local household’s intertemporal wealth constraint as well as the time profile of
its consumption. The wealth effect might be massive enough to overpower the
14Also, recent intra-European migration history might seem at odds with our ‘no interna-
tional mobility’ assumption. In order to avoid what would be a misunderstanding, it is worth
stressing that the purpose of a counterfactual experiment is not to forecast nor to explain what
is currently being observed (among other things, some intra-EU migration due to pre-existing
absolute wage differences), but rather to evaluate how –and by how much in percentage terms–
an exogenous shock is likely to deviate the economy from its initial equilibrium, everything
else equal. Given that the technological catch-up of which we want to evaluate the effects is
likely to improve the wages in the new member states relative to those of the old member
states, the shock-induced migration is likely to be from old to new member states, hence
contributing to reduce the observed flows due to pre-existing absolute wage differences.
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effect of intertemporal substitution on short term consumption with some new
member-states’ households actually reducing their savings on the whole time
horizon. The restructuring of short term aggregate demand will cause intersec-
toral shifts of activity, possibly in favor of more capital intensive sectors, which
could attract some (modest amount of) capital out of old member states also
in the short term, and therefore increase GDP also in t1. All these effects will
contribute to increase aggregate welfare, despite the fact that in some countries,
capital intensive sectors are on average also more skilled-labor intensive, so that
in the short run, low-skilled workers could experience slightly falling real wages.
The above description indeed applies to most new member states, as Table 3
reveals, with aggregate gains that prove quite robust to the type of competition
assumed (as well as to changes in important parameter values –unreported to
conserve on space).
The only new member countries that make exception to the above narrative
are Cyprus and Slovenia. The reason for this is quite obvious: in all but a few
sectors, these two countries lie close to or above the EU low-envelope technology
frontier –see Table 2– so that they essentially experience only the indirect effects
of their neighbor’s technology upgrading shocks (as do all the incumbent mem-
ber states). For Cyprus, even though aggregate welfare only slightly improves
in all scenarios, intersectoral adjustments are quite drastic with foreign com-
petition inducing a strong reallocation effect in favor of relatively skilled-labor
intensive sectors which quite unambiguously hurts the least skilled workers in
the long run. The welfare impact on Slovenia is essentially non-significantly
different from zero as it fluctuates by very small amounts around the null with
changes in parameter values.
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Table 3: Computed effects of ‘deep integration’ shock on new member states: % deviations w.r.t. initial steady state
 𝜓 = welfare; 𝐶𝑜𝑛 = private consumption; 𝐾ௌ௨௣= capital supplied locally; 𝑟𝑤௦௞ , 𝑟𝑤௨௡ = real wages skilled, unskilled 
CRS   (𝜎 = 1.3 , 𝜎ாଶ଻௄ = 2.0) 
 BGR CYP CZE EST HUN LTU LVA MLT POL ROU SVK SVN 
       𝜓             
   𝐶𝑜𝑛௧భ            
   𝐶𝑜𝑛௧మ             
   𝐾௧భ
ௌ௨௣            
   𝐾௧మ
ௌ௨௣            
   𝐺𝐷𝑃௧భ            
   𝐺𝐷𝑃௧మ             
   𝑟𝑤௦௞,௧భ            
   𝑟𝑤௦௞,௧మ            
  𝑟𝑤௨௡,௧భ            
  𝑟𝑤௨௡,௧మ             
IRS   (𝜎 = 1.3 , 𝜎ாଶ଻௄  = 2.0) 
 BGR CYP CZE EST HUN LTU LVA MLT POL ROU SVK SVN 
      𝜓            
   𝐶𝑜𝑛௧భ             
   𝐶𝑜𝑛௧మ              
   𝐾௧భ
ௌ௨௣            
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ௌ௨௣            
   𝐺𝐷𝑃௧భ             
   𝐺𝐷𝑃௧మ              
   𝑟𝑤௦௞,௧భ             
   𝑟𝑤௦௞,௧మ             
  𝑟𝑤௨௡,௧భ             
  𝑟𝑤௨௡,௧మ              
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4.2.2 Old member states
Old member states are only indirectly affected by the trade shock, and for this
reason, the outcome of the enlargement process on these economies is more
difficult to anticipate. Two mechanisms are dominantly at work here, with con-
flicting implications for workers’ welfare. Firstly, the rise in second-period rental
price of capital in new member states induces an outflow of that factor from
incumbent member countries, which contributes to reduce their second-period
GDP and to push local wages down. Secondly –and consequently—the rising
expected future return to capital induces local households to substitute future to
short term consumption which makes second-period capital endowments higher,
hence pushing up GDP and wages. The welfare outcome for workers will there-
fore crucially depend on the values of two elasticities: the CET parameter σKE27
that governs how easily physical capital can be relocated internationally in the
long run, and the intertemporal CES paremeter σ that determines how respon-
sive the t2-supply of capital is to future profit opportunities expected in t1. We
shall therefore report in Table 4 results for combinations of high and low values
of these two parameters, with σ=1.3 or 0.7; and long-run (t2) values of σ
K
E27=2.0
or 0.5.
Other mechanisms will of course influence these effects. In particular, ac-
knowledging the possibility of imperfect competition in some sectors will affect
GDP because endogenous variety (due to exit/entry of competitors) affects the
cost to firms of intermediate inputs, as well as the cost of living for consumers.
The results reported in Table 5 indeed acknowledge the contribution of these
additional mechanisms.15
Inspection of Table 4 reveals that, quite robustly w.r.t. changes in parameter
values, most –but not all– countries benefit from the EU enlargement shock: in
some scenarios, Spain and Sweden could indeed experience extremely modest
losses, but the aggregate welfare cost for Denmark is more substantial –ranging
between -0.5% and -0.9%– and turns out to be quite robust. The reason behind
the deterioration of these countries’ intertemporal terms of trade seems to lie
essentially in the relatively high share of non-physical assets in their total wealth
(with Denmark as the extreme case).
15We also explore the possibility for labor supply to be endogenized using a reduced form
wage curve, but the contribution of this mechanism turns out to be so minor that we do not
report any results for this case.
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Table 4: Computed effects of ‘deep integration’ shock on old member states, CRS: % deviations w.r.t. initial steady state
 𝜓 = welfare; 𝐶𝑜𝑛 = private consumption; 𝐾ௌ௨௣= capital supplied locally; 𝑟𝑤௦௞ , 𝑟𝑤௨௡ = real wages skilled, unskilled 
CRS, high international mobility of capital (𝜎ாଶ଻௄ = 2.0) 
 AUT BEL DEU DNK ESP FIN FRA GBR GRC IRL ITA LUX NLD PRT SWE 
          𝝈 1.3  0.7  1.3  0.7  1.3  0.7  1.3  0.7  1.3  0.7  1.3  0.7  1.3  0.7  1.3  0.7  1.3  0.7  1.3  0.7  1.3  0.7  1.3  0.7  1.3  0.7  1.3  0.7  1.3  0.7  
        𝜓                               
   𝐶𝑜𝑛௧భ                              
   𝐶𝑜𝑛௧మ                               
   𝐾௧భ
ௌ௨௣                              
   𝐾௧మ
ௌ௨௣                              
   𝐺𝐷𝑃௧భ                              
   𝐺𝐷𝑃௧మ                               
   𝑟𝑤௦௞,௧భ                               
   𝑟𝑤௦௞,௧మ                               
  𝑟𝑤௨௡,௧భ                              
  𝑟𝑤௨௡,௧మ                               
CRS, low international mobility of capital (𝜎ாଶ଻௄ = 0.5) 
  AUT BEL DEU DNK ESP FIN FRA GBR GRC IRL ITA LUX NLD PRT SWE 
         𝝈 1.3  0.7  1.3  0.7  1.3  0.7  1.3  0.7  1.3  0.7  1.3  0.7  1.3  0.7  1.3  0.7  1.3  0.7  1.3  0.7  1.3  0.7  1.3  0.7  1.3  0.7  1.3  0.7  1.3  0.7  
       𝜓                              
   𝐶𝑜𝑛௧భ                              
   𝐶𝑜𝑛௧మ                               
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The time profile of aggregate consumption adjusts, as expected, with house-
holds quite robustly accumulating more capital: second-period physical assets
KHout2 rise by some approximate 5% in all countries. The first-period outflow
of capital is negligible so that short term production capacities, and therefore
GDPt1 , are essentially unaffected; real wages (expressed in terms of the price of
the aggregate consumption basket) of both skilled and unskilled workers (rwsk
and rwun respectively) either increase (mildly) or remain unaffected in all coun-
tries for all parameter configurations. In the second period, as we know, the
amount of capital locally available for production (KSupt2 ) depends on the bal-
ance between induced accumulation and geographic relocation. When the value
of σ is set to 1.3, the first effect systematically outperforms the second: KSupt2
unambiguously increases in all the old EU-member states, and so do aggregate
output and real wages of both skilled and unskilled workers. Reducing the value
of σ below unity breaks this robustness result: the signs of the changes in long-
run production capacities, as well as that of GDP growth, now depend on how
easily production capacities can be relocated within the EU. Quite remarkably,
however, the down-push of goods’ prices induced by the positive productivity
shock of deep integration lowers the consumer price index, at least as much, if
not more, than the wages for both skills in most countries, so that for all param-
eter configurations the large majority of workers in the old-member states see
their purchasing power at worst unaffected, but in most cases improved, by the
EU enlargement shock. The strongest exception to this claim is Luxembourg,
where real wages could be eroded by less than half a percent depending on the
parameter configuration used.
The numbers reported in Table 5 have been computed under the assumption
that monopolistic competition prevails in a large subset of sectors.16 We learn
from this table that the aggregate welfare conclusions remain qualitatively the
same as in the case of perfect competition, though quantitatively significantly
amplified, confirming among other things, the possibility of a deterioration of
the intertemporal terms of trade for Denmark, and, to a lesser extent, for Sweden
and Spain, especially under high international mobility of capital (σKE27=2.0).
Intertemporal consumption smoothing behavior is of course unaffected, and for-
ward looking households quite vigorously accumulate physical assets, and indeed
more so than under overall perfect competition. The only short term effects are
induced by demand restructuring (the demand for investment goods rising at
the expense of private consumption), with real wages remaining essentially un-
affected, the heaviest loss of -0.1% being for Portuguese skilled workers. The
sign of the long term effects on GDP again depends on the balance between
the households’ willingness to smooth their consumption through time, and the
second period speed of international capital mobility: it is not affected by the
change in the competitive game assumption on product markets. Assuming
IRS technologies and imperfect competition only amplifies the magnitude of
the effects. The ‘best case’ scenario –with strong response of saving (high σ)
16Food, Beverages and Tobacco; Textiles and Textile Production; Chemicals and Plastics;
Basic and Fabricated Metals; Electrical and Optical Equipment; Transport Equipment; and
Construction.
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and not too highly mobile physical capital between countries (σKE27 low)– is
characterized by a widespread boost of aggregate activity, with GDP growth
rates between 1.1% (Denmark) and 2.3% (Greece), against 0.6% and 1.1% for
the same countries when perfect competition prevails. Real wages unambigu-
ously increase for all workers, at a pace included between 1.2% and 2.9% for the
skilled and between 1.0% and 3.0% for the unskilled. The ‘worst case’ scenario,
on the other hand, suggests the possibility of a bleaker outcome for workers:
when intertemporal substitution in consumption is not strong enough (σ=0.5)
and physical capital displaces easily across national borders (σKE27=2.0). The
outflow of capital is in this case large enough to reduce physical capital avail-
able to firms in older EU member countries; wages are unambiguously pushed
downward. All workers are negatively impacted with unskilled workers gener-
ally suffering the heaviest losses in most countries; real wages fall by percent
amounts between -0.2 and -1.2 for the skilled workers, between -0.2 and -1.6 for
unskilled workers. Though these unpleasant results are associated with a some-
what extreme parameter configuration, such a configuration is not completely
unlikely. The results should therefore raise concern, in particular in view of the
fact that improving education alone, which is often thought as a cure-all policy,
is unlikely to be enough.
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Table 5: Computed effects of ‘deep integration’ shock on old member states, IRS: % deviations w.r.t. initial steady state
 𝜓 = welfare; 𝐶𝑜𝑛 = private consumption; 𝐾ௌ௨௣= capital supplied locally; 𝑟𝑤௦௞ , 𝑟𝑤௨௡ = real wages skilled, unskilled 
IRS, high international mobility of capital (𝜎ாଶ଻௄ =2.0) 
 AUT BEL DEU DNK ESP FIN FRA GBR GRC IRL ITA LUX NLD PRT SWE 
          𝝈 1.3 0.7 1.3 0.7 1.3 0.7 1.3 0.7 1.3 0.7 1.3 0.7 1.3 0.7 1.3 0.7 1.3 0.7 1.3 0.7 1.3 0.7 1.3 0.7 1.3 0.7 1.3 0.7 1.3 0.7 
        𝜓                              
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have explored the relative degree of technological efficiency
characterizing the new and the incumbent member states of the EU in their use
of skilled and unskilled labor in year 2007, at the time of the fifth enlargement
wave. Our industry level econometric analysis indicates clear and systematic
patterns of efficiency gaps for labor productivity between the two groups of
countries. One most likely explanation, is that these relative inefficiencies are
caused by barriers to technology adoption responsible for reducing international
technology diffusion. 20th century history and the fact that most of the new
member states were part of the Soviet bloc give considerable credit to such
explanations emphasizing the role of trade restrictions, institutions and policies,
in the build-up of these barriers. For new member states therefore, joining the
EU is likely to eliminate most of these impediments. Indeed, the disciplines
required to reduce such technology adoption barriers are essentially the same
as those discussed as necessary to achieve ‘deep integration’ within the EU, a
concept that is widely used in trade policy discussions but defined somewhat
informally. Bridging the literatures on ‘barriers to technology adoption’ and
on ‘deep integration’, we have proposed a reinterpretation of the concept of
‘deep integration’ that can easily be implemented as a reduced form shock in
numerical policy evaluation exercises.
Our appraisal of ‘deep integration’ takes the form of a technological upgrad-
ing of total labor productivity in new member states. The amplitude of this
upgrading is inferred, rather naturally, from econometric estimation results as
the TLP up-shift required to place these countries on the lower-envelope tech
frontier of incumbent EU members. The resulting measure of the technological
shock that is associated with ‘deep integration’ is arguably conservative since it
is not unlikely that in a span of thirty years, some of these new member states
could outperform some older member economies.
Though particularly relevant to the EU enlargement experience, our def-
inition of deep integration is clearly not specific to that context. It can be
implemented to evaluate any deep integration efforts, and in particular, in any
single-country calibrated GE model for quantitative evaluation. One thing that
makes the 2004-7 EU enlargement episode so special, is its size. Indeed, ex-
perienced simultaneously by ten new EU members, such a shock is likely to
have non trivial, indirect general equilibrium effects, also on incumbent mem-
ber states. A proper quantitative evaluation of these effects calls for a full
country-disaggregated model of production and trade within the EU27. We
have provided such a quantitative exploration by use of a numerical intertem-
poral GE model of the EU27, calibrated on 2007 data.
From a policy perspective, the main conclusion we reach, is that, for most pa-
rameter configurations, workers’ welfare in incumbent member countries is not
negatively impacted, despite the rather drastic improvement in competitiveness
experienced by new members. In the current context of rising populism and
widespread anti-EU resentment, this outcome is rather reassuring. However
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welcome as this conclusion may be, it should not over-shade the finding that,
admittedly only with a specific model structure (most sectors subject to in-
creasing returns to scale, with monopolistic competition and costless entry/exit
of firms) and under a somewhat extreme but not entirely unlikely parameter
configuration (low intertemporal substitution in consumption and high interna-
tional mobility of physical capital), almost all workers of the old member states
could experience a fall in the purchasing power of their wages. In this scenario,
improving education alone, which often serves as a cure-all policy for European
policy makers, is unlikely to be enough given that real wages of both skilled and
unskilled workers fall alike.
The framework we have used in this paper could be extended, in several
directions. First, it would obviously be worth investigating how the inclusion
of physical capital endowments affects the relative position of countries’ tech-
nology frontiers. This is far from being a trivial extension, however: it requires
extending the estimation method to a three dimensional technology frontier,
presumably assuming two-level nested CES technology structures.
Another short-coming of our analysis is that it is based on a cross-section
estimation and therefore only builds on a snapshot; it is likely to miss potentially
important dynamic forces actively at work, that could affect each country’s
relative technological position with respect to an evolving minimal “state-of-the-
art” technical envelope. A dynamic approach to the estimation of the technology
frontiers by use of panel-data techniques could provide more nuanced evaluations
of the amplitude of the implicit barriers to technologies that existed prior to
2004-7.
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A Data
In following the procedure of backing out the sectorial technology frontiers of
the E27 countries, we rely on the data from the World Input Output Database
(WIOD) along with the data compiled by A´lverez-Martinez and Lo´pez-Cobo
(2016). WIOD’s Socio-Economic Accounts contain data on employment (in
terms of number of workers, number of hours worked and respective shares w.r.t.
educational attainment). Hence it is possible to construct, for each country and
sector the skilled (Lsk) and unskilled (Lun) labor, associated wage rates (p
L
sk
and pLun), skill-premium (p
L
sk/p
L
un) and the efficiency parameters (Ask and Aun)
of the model. The data on gross output and value added components as well as
taxes on each type of labor are from the social accounting matrices by A´lvarez-
Mart´ınez and Lo´pez-Cobo (2016). Sectoral aggregation of the data is conducted
under International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) Rev.3.
WIOD aggregates the seven International Standard Classification of Edu-
cation (ISCED) levels of education into low, medium and high skill categories.
In order to further aggregate the labor input into skilled and unskilled labor
classes, we assume that the unskilled labor category in the model corresponds
to low skilled labor, and the skilled labor category corresponds to medium and
high skilled classifications of WIOD. Hence, it becomes possible to calculate the
hourly wage rates of skilled and unskilled labor in each country/sector, making
use of the data on labor compensation at the skill level and of the total number
of hours worked by each skill category. Following the standard convention as in
26
CC (2006) that relative wages are equal to relative efficiency units, we construct
the skilled labor by making use of the wage ratio of the high skilled labor to
medium-skilled labor along with their respective shares in the hours worked.17
B Formal description of the calibrated GE Model
Endogenous countries belong to the set E27 which includes the 27 member
states of the European Union in 2007, our base year; the model is closed by
a ‘rest-of-the-world’ (here after RoW ) that is kept exogenous except for the
volume of its trade which is price responsive. The prices of the RoW serve as
numeraire. Countries are indexed by i, i′ ∈ E27∪RoW. All European countries
have identical structures; in the description of the individual national economy
that follows, we therefore drop the country subscript where no confusion can
arise. The model is infinite horizon intertemporal, time-aggregated into two
periods, a short term and a long term, separated by a span of 30 years after
which steady-state is assumed. We drop the time subscript where no confusion
can arise.
B.1. Households and assets
We aggregate all national households into a single representative agent. This
agent is endowed with two types of labor, skilled and unskilled, indexed l ∈
{sk, un} , in amount LHoul which she endogenously allocates to different sectors
of activity:18 Lsupl,s denotes the supply of labor type l to sector s. We model
the household’s allocation of labor across sectors as price-responsive resulting
from labor income maximization subject to a constant elasticity of transforma-
tion (hereafter CET) frontier: a rising relative wage in one sector will therefore
induce an inflow of labor to the sector, the size of which will depend on the
value of an elasticity of transformation σL
sup
l ; intersectoral mobility of labor
is typically higher in the long than in the short run, and we therefore choose
significantly higher values for σL
sup
l in the second period. Solving the house-
hold’s optimal labor allocation problem immediately yields the following supply
17An alternative method for calculating the skilled and unskilled labor categories would
rely on the estimated Mincerian coefficients as in Caselli and Coleman (2006). Utilizing the
estimated coefficients of Mincer equations from Roszkowska (2014) for years 2002 and 2010,
we have calculated alternative indicators of Lsk and Lun. The results are comparable with
difference in estimated coefficients around 1%.
18Upper-lining a variable indicates that it is assumed exogenous, fixed to its base year level.
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system derived from first order conditions:
Lsupl,s = α
Lsup
l,s
[
pL
sup
l,s
pL
Hou
l
]σLsupl
[1− URl] LHoul l ∈ {sk, un}
(B.1)[
pL
Hou
l
]1+σLsupl
=
∑
s
αL
sup
l,s
[
pL
sup
l,s
]1+σLsupl
l ∈ {sk, un}
(B.2)
where pL
sup
l,s is the price of labor type l earned by workers in sector s, p
LHou
l is
the ideal price aggregator over sectors for labor type l, and the αs are (simple
transforms of) the CET share parameters;19 observe that we have multiplied
labor endowments by a factor [1− URl] that reflects the possible existence of
unemployment at rate URl.
Households also own assets which they accumulate by endogenous savings
decisions. We formally identify three types of assets:20 claims on physical cap-
ital, local government bonds and bonds issued by the RoW , though we make
the unrealistic –albeit innocuous– assumption that the two types of bonds are
valued in the same price, the RoW price, and that they both carry the same
nominal interest rate, the RoW interest rate.21 We then write the national
household’s budget constraint as follows:
pInv
Hou
t
KHout+1
κ
+ pRoWt
[
BGovt+1 +B
RoW
t+1
]
= SavHout + p
RoW
t−1
[
BGovt +B
RoW
t
]
+ pInv
Hou
t (1− δ)
KHout
κ
(B.3)
where pInv
Hou
is the unit price of new equipments, κ is a parameter that con-
verts annual flow services of private capital (KHou) into a stock, SavHou is pri-
vate flow savings, δ is a depreciation rate assumed constant.22 Private savings
is flow income (IncHou) minus income taxes (TxInc
Hou
), net transfers abroad
19Throughout this paper, the σs will refer to transformation (substitution) elasticity param-
eters from the CET (CES) functional form constraints from which optimal supplies (demands)
are derived. Also, the αs will refer throughout the paper to (the same simple transforms of)
the share parameters of the CET (CES) functions.
20For base year accounting reasons, we actually identify a fourth type of bond, one bought
from other European governments. This stock is held constant, and therefore justified for
base year accounting reasons only. We neglect writing this term in the equations to ease the
reading of the model.
21As will be emphasized later, we shall further assume that they are in constant supply.
22Note that older vintages of capital net of depreciation are assumed valued as new equip-
ments.
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(pCon
Hou
TrHou→RoW )23 and consumption expenditures (pCon
Hou
ConHou)24:
SavHou = IncHou − T IncHou − pConHouTrHou→RoW − pConHouConHou (B.4)
with taxes on income collected at fixed rates τ Inc
Hou
:
T Inc
Hou
= τ Inc
Hou
IncHou (B.5)
The household earns income by supplying production factor services, possi-
bly earns unexpected super-natural profits from firms (ProfHou) in the short
run, benefits from government transfers (a flow assumed constant in real terms
though valued at public consumption deflator: pCon
Gov
TrGov→Hou), and earns
interests (at rate rRoW ) on its holding of bonds:
(B.6)
IncHou =
∑
l
pL
Hou
l [1− URl]LHoul + pK
Hou
KHou + ProfHou
+ pCon
Gov
TrGov→Hou + rRoW pRoW
[
BGov +BRoW
]
The household makes its consumption decisions by maximizing its intertem-
poral utility subject to its budget constraint (B.3). Assuming CES intertempo-
ral preferences (with substitution elasticity σ), perfect foresight and imposing
steady state restrictions in the long run, the first order conditions yield
[
ConHout+1
ConHout
]1/σ
=
pCon
Hou
t
pCon
Hou
t+1
[
1 + rK
Hou
t+1 − p
InvHou
t+1
pInv
Hou
t
]
ρ
(B.7)
where pInv
Hou
t is the unit cost of investment goods, ρ is the rate of time prefer-
ence, and rK
Hou
t+1 is the rate of return expected at time t to be reaped on physical
capital at time t+ 1:
1 + rK
Hou
t+1 =
pK
Hou
t+1 κ+ (1− δ)pInv
Hou
t+1
pInv
Hou
t
(B.8)
The optimal composition of the aggregate consumption basket ConHou, as
well as the ideal cost of living index pCon
Hou
are jointly determined from intra-
period utility maximization assuming CES preferences; from rearranging first
23There are also some transfers between EU households; these flows are kept constant and
we drop them from the expressions to ease reading.
24It should be mentioned that in some sectors, inventory accumulation flows may be sig-
nificantly different from zero; to limit spurious effects, we treat this residual component of
demand as a constant term in the private sector’s expenditures. We drop this term from the
equation to ease reading.
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order conditions, we obtain:
cHous = α
cHou
s
[
pCon
Hou
ps
]σConHou
ConHou (B.9)
[
pCon
Hou
]1−σConHou
=
∑
s
αc
Hou
s [ ps]
1−σConHou
(B.10)
where σCon
Hou
is the substitution elasticity, and the αs are (simple transforms
of) the CES share parameters. This completes our description of the household.
B.2. Producers
Production sectors are indexed s or s′. Some of these industries are perfectly
competitive with firms making use of constant returns to scale (hereafter CRS)
production functions, others operate increasing returns to scale (hereafter IRS)
technologies within an imperfectly competitive market structure. These two
subsets of industries are identified respectively as SCRS and SIRS .
In sectors s ∈ SIRS , firms are assumed symmetric within national bound-
aries. We describe the individual producer’s behavior so that all variables refer
to a single firm. A firm faces a fixed production cost which we assume in the
form of a real amount of foregone output denoted by Fxs; we then write the
firms total production as Zs+Fxs where Zs represents the volume of sales. The
presence of fixed costs introduces a wedge between average and marginal costs,
respectively noted Avcosts and Ma
cost
s , which we formalize with the following
relation:
Avcosts Zs = Ma
cost
s [Zs + Fxs] s ∈ SIRS (B.11)
Large group monopolistic competition (i.e., competition in the form of a Nash
game in prices) prevails so that firms’ optimal pricing strategy is to mark-up
price pZs over marginal production costs:
pZs −Macosts
pZs
=
1
σAs
s ∈ SIRS (B.12)
where σAs is the price elasticity of the demand curve that the firm faces. The
definition of super-natural profits then immediately follows:
Profs =
[
pZs −Avcosts
]
Zs s ∈ SIRS (B.13)
In the other industries, those that belong to SCRS , we set Fxs = 0; perfect
competition prevails and profit maximization imposes to firms to price their
output at marginal cost:
pZs = Ma
cost
s s ∈ SCRS (B.14)
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In these industries, because of CRS, the scale of firms and their number are
immaterial so we may set Ns = 1 for s ∈ SCRS without loss of generality: this
will prove convenient as many equations below will then be written identically
for all sectors.
Marginal costs result from choosing optimal bundles of various variable in-
puts conditional on multilevel CES technical constraints that have common
architecture for all s ∈ SIRS ∪SCRS ; we therefore drop the sector subscript s in
what follows to lighten expressions. At the upper level of this nested structure,
a material input aggregate is combined with value added to produce output
Z + Fx. Cost minimization yields the following optimal choice system:
X = αX
[
Macost
pX
]σZ
[Z + Fx] (B.15)
Q = αQ
[
Macost
pQ
]σZ
[Z + Fx] (B.16)[
Macosts
]1−σZ
= αX
[
pX
]1−σZ
+ αQ
[
pQ
]1−σZ
(B.17)
where X and Q denote respectively volumes of material and value-added input
aggregates, pX and pQ their associated prices, σZ the substitution elasticity, and
the αs are (simple transforms of) CES share parameters as usual. Aggregate
material inputs are themselves CES bundles of goods from sectors s′ available
locally at market prices ps′ ; cost minimization yields the firm’s intermediate
demands:
XXs′ = α
XX
s′
[
pX
ps′
]σX
X (B.18)[
pX
]1−σX
=
∑
s′
αXXs′ [ ps′ ]
1−σX
(B.19)
with XXs′ the firm’s demand for goods from industry s′, σX a substitution
elasticity parameter and αs the share parameters. Value added results from
combining services from an aggregate capital (Kap) and an aggregate labor
(Lab) intrants, respectively priced pKap and pLab; these are imperfect substi-
tutes with the technology imposing constant substitution elasticity; under cost
minimization the optimal amount of services used for production is determined
by:
Kap = αKap
[
pQ
pKap
]σQ
Q (B.20)
Lab = αLab
[
pQ
pLab
]σQ
Q (B.21)[
pQ
]1−σQ
= αKap
[
pKap
]1−σQ
+ αLab
[
pLab
]1−σQ
(B.22)
Relative abundance of public infrastructure is likely to affect the local producer’s
competitive position; one way to capture this is to assume that private and
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public capital enter the production process as imperfect substitutes so that low
public infrastructure tend to force local firms to compensate this scarcity by
renting more private capital. Private and public capital services are therefore
combined assuming a CES constraint with low substitution elasticity parameter
σKap, with demand for private and public capital services (respectively Kdem
and KGdem) determined from first order cost minimization conditions:
Kdem = αK
[
pKap
(1 + τK) pK
]σKap
Kap (B.23)
KGdem = αKG
[
pKap
(1 + τKG) pKG
]σKap
Kap (B.24)[
pKap
]1−σKap
= αK
[
(1 + τK) pK
]1−σKap
+ αKG
[
(1 + τKG) pKG
]1−σKap
(B.25)
where pK and pKG are the rental prices of private and public capital, τK and
τKG are (possibly negative) tax rate parameters affecting the use of these capital
inputs. Producers also hire imperfectly substitutable skilled and unskilled labor
services from local workers; the CES demand system for these services again
immediately follows from cost minimization; we write:
Ldeml = θ
σLab−1αL
dem
l
[
pLab
(1 + τLl ) p
L
l
]σLab
Lab (B.26)
[
pLab
]1−σLab
= θσ
Lab−1∑
l
αL
dem
l
[
(1 + τLl ) p
L
l
]1−σLab
(B.27)
where τLl are (possibly negative) fixed tax rates affecting the cost of labor ser-
vices to firms; θ is a shift parameter affecting total labor productivity: this is
of course the parameter that will be affected by our technological upgrading
experiment.
We close the description of the production sector by collecting for future use
the taxes paid by the firm on inputs:
TK = τK pKKdem (B.28)
TKG = τKG pKGKGdem (B.29)
TLl = τ
L
l p
L
l L
dem
l (B.30)
and acknowledge existence of indirect taxes at fixed rates levied by national
governments on local firms’ sales:
TZ = τZ pZZ (B.31)
B.3. The government
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Government income (IncGov) includes capital rental revenues, income taxes
payed by households, taxes payed on primary inputs by firms, as well as indirect
taxes on products; formally:
IncGov = pKG KGsup + T Inc
Gov
+
∑
s
Ns
[
TKs + T
KG
s +
∑
l
TLs,l + T
Z
s
]
(B.32)
where all notations have been previously introduced except KGsup which de-
notes the country’s endowment in public infrastructure.
Our interest in this paper is not on public policies, and we therefore make
assumptions so as to keep the public sector as neutral as possible. For this
reason, we assume that domestic bonds are valued at price pRoW , and carry
the same constant interest rate rRoW as foreign bonds; furthermore, the stock
of domestic bonds is constant, so that the government’s intertemporal budget
constraint can be written as:
(B.33)IncGov = rRoWBGov + pCon
Gov
ConGov + pCon
Gov
TrGov→Hou
which defines public aggregate consumption ConGovresidually. The sectorial
composition of public consumption cGovs is then determined by minimizing a
CES cost function with low substitution elasticity σCon
Gov
, which yields the
following demand system
cGovs = α
cGov
s
[
pCon
Gov
ps
]σConGov
ConGov (B.34)
[
pCon
Gov
]1−σConGov
=
∑
s
αc
Gov
s [ ps]
1−σConGov
(B.35)
B.4. European private capital market
All the physical capital of European households is pooled into a single European
capital stock; this aggregate EU stock, denotedKE27, is then optimally allocated
to each country within the Union, and to each sector within each country, so
as to maximize the rental revenues of the pooled capital subject to a two-level
nested CET constraint. Formally, the optimal allocation of private physical
capital services within the European Union is determined by the following set
of nested CET supply equations derived from first order conditions:
Ksupi = α
Ksup
i
[
pKi
pKE27
]σKE27
KE27 i ∈ E27 (B.36)[
pKE27
]1+σKE27 = ∑
i∈E27
αK
sup
i
[
pKi
]1+σKE27 (B.37)
33
Ksupi,s = α
Ksup
i,s
[
pKi,s
pKi
]σKi
Ksupi i ∈ E27 (B.38)[
pKi
]1+σKi = ∑
s
αK
sup
i,s
[
pKi,s
]1+σKi i ∈ E27 (B.39)
The first equation determines the supply of private capital services to each na-
tional economy Ksupi as a share of Europe’s aggregate stock KE27; the share
adjusts endogenously to changes in relative rental prices within the E27. The
second equation defines the ideal service price index of KE27, a function of
country specific capital rental prices pKi . These two equations are the FOCs
associated with the upper level CET. The next two equations characterize the
optimal supply of physical capital across sectors within each country, conditional
on the second level CET constraint. Here, pKi,s is the rental price of private cap-
ital services payed by firms in sector s country i, and Ksupi,s is the amount of
these services made available on that specific factor market. Both transforma-
tion elasticities σKE27 and σ
K
i are set to significantly higher values in the second
period than in the first to capture higher mobility in the long term.
We still have to define the aggregation process that determines KE27; we
formalize this as follows:
KE27 =
E27∑
i
KHoui (B.40)
Observe that with such a definition of the aggregate European capital stock, we
have to reward each national household for its capital ownership at the same
unit price pKE27 so that:
pK
Hou
i = p
K
E27, i ∈ E27 (B.41)
Consistently we allocate supernatural profits to national households in pro-
portion to the ownership share they hold on KE27, so that:
ProfHou =
∑
j
∑
s
Profjs
 KHou
KE27
(B.42)
Pooling capital as we did also requires pooling savings, and clearly imposes
some restrictions on our modeling of investment. We impose that
pInv
Hou
i = p
Inv
E27 i ∈ E27 (B.43)
where pInvE27 is the unit price of European aggregate investment, and therefore
write pooled European real gross capital formation as:
InvE27,t =
∑
i∈E27
[
KHoui,t+1
κ
− K
Hou
i,t
κ
]
(B.44)
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To determine the composition of this investment good, we assume a two-level
CES technology, and write its cost-minimizing input structure as:
Invi = α
Inv
i
[
pInvE27
pInvi
]σInvE27
InvE27 (B.45)[
pInvE27
]1−σInvE27 = ∑
i∈E27
αInvi
[
pInvi
]1−σInvE27 (B.46)
Ii,s = α
I
i,s
[
pInvi
pi,s
]σInv
Invi (B.47)[
pInvi
]1−σInv
=
∑
s
αIi,s [ pi,s]
1−σInv
(B.48)
The upper level defines the composition of the European aggregate InvE27 in
terms of national sub-aggregate flows Invi, and the lower level the composition
of the latter in terms of local goods from different sectors Ii,s associated to each
are the ideal price indices respectively pInvE27 and p
Inv
i as usual, the σs and the
αs are the substitution elasticities and share parameters respectively. Observe
that this is a very flexible structure; for instance, one could set σInv to zero
which would impose constant shares in terms of country sub-aggregates.
B.5. Trade
We collect all the EU country demands for a market good s into a real variable
Ai,s, an acronym reminiscent of country i’s absorption:
Ai,s =
∑
s′
Ni,s′ XXi,s,s′ + c
Hou
i,s + c
Gov
i,s + Ii,s i ∈ E27 (B.49)
We make this good a cost minimizing CES aggregate of goods produced in the
same industry by firms worldwide, and write the first order conditions as follow:
Expi′,i,s = α
Exp
i′,i,s
[
pi,s
(1 + τZi′,s)p
Z
i′,s
]σAs
Ai,s i
′, i ∈ E27 ∪RoW (B.50)
[ pi,s]
1−σAs =
∑
i′
Ni′,s α
Exp
i′,i,s
[
(1 + τZi′,s)p
Z
i′,s
]1−σAs (B.51)
Here, Expi′,i;s is the total demand by country i for goods produced by an indi-
vidual producer of sector s in country i′; the good is sold at price (1 + τZi′,s)pZi′,s.
In this system, if i ∈ RoW , pi,s = pZi,s = 1 and Ai,s = Ai,s for all s, because
the rest of the world is assumed exogenous. Observe that these equations also
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apply if i = i′, defining therefore for each endogenous country the domestic
demand functions for the domestically produced goods.25 Observe also that,
in perfectly competitive industries where there is a single aggregate producer
(Ni′,s = 1, s ∈ SCRS) this is a specification that captures the Armington as-
sumption; in imperfectly competitive industries we have a form of Dixit-Stiglitz
specification.
B.6. Equilibrium conditions
Goods
On each market for good s, equilibrium requires that supplies equal demands:
Zi′,s =
∑
i
Expi′,i,s (B.52)
Labor
Sector specific wages ensure that supply and demand balance in each sector for
each type of labor:
Lsupl,s = Ns L
dem
l,s (B.53)
The short term unemployment rate is either assumed fixed to its base year
level, or endogenized by use of a reduced form wage curve specific o each type:
Ln
[
pL
Hou
l
pConHou
]
= −εl Ln
[
URl
UR0l
]
(B.54)
where εl is a constant elasticity.
For the long term, we assume that labor supply remains at its short term
endogenously determined level.
Capital
Equilibrium country and sector specific rental price of private capital services
is determined so that,
Ksupi,s = Ni,sK
dem
i,s (B.55)
National public infrastructure is unlikely to be sector specific; we compute
pKG by imposing that:
KGsupi =
∑
s
Ni,sKG
dem
i,s (B.56)
25The parameters αExp
i′,i,s = 0 for i′, i ∈ RoW by calibration to base year data.
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Geographic location of firms
In the short run, it is costly for firms to enter or exit the market: the geographic
location of activity is therefore held fixed at t1 (determined from base year
Herfindahl concentration indices) and unexpected shocks will induce non-zero
super-natural profits which are redistributed to capital owners (see equation
(B.42)). With time, however, these non-zero profits will induce entry or exit
so that the total number of firms and their geographic distribution become
endogenous. The long run equilibrium number of competitors Nt2,s (s ∈ SIRS)
is determined by imposing zero profits at t2:
pZs = Av
cost
s s ∈ SIRS (B.57)
Walras’ law
All European agents satisfy their budget constraints, and equilibrium is imposed
on each market, therefore we know from Walras’ law that the RoW budget
constraint is redundant and should automatically be satisfied; we check that
this is indeed the case:
(B.58)
∑
i ∈E27
{
pCon
Hou
i Tr
Hou→RoW
i +
∑
s
pZRoW,s ExpRoW,i,s
}
=
∑
i∈E27
{∑
s
(1 + τZi,s)p
Z
i,s Expi,RoW,s
}
+ rRoWBRoW
B.7. Welfare
We evaluate country i’s welfare using the equivalent variation index ψi deter-
mined as follows:
∞∑
t
Ψt
[
ψi Con
Hou
i,0
]1− 1σ
1− 1σ
=
∞∑
t
Ψt
[
ConHoui,t
]1− 1σ
1− 1σ
(B.59)
where ConHoui,0 is initial steady-state (base-year) value of aggregate consumption,
and Ψt is the discount factor.
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C Base Case Parameter Values
Households and assets:
σL
sup
l 0.30 / 5.0 (Short / long run)
σ 1.3
σCon
Hou
1.2
Producers:
σZs 0.20
σXs 0.25
σQs 1.0
σKaps 2.0
σLabs 1.4
Government:
σCon
Gov
0.30
European private capital market:
σKE27 0.10 / 2.0 (Short / long run)
σK 0.30 / 3.0 (Short / long run)
σInvE27 3.0
σInv 1.3
δ 0.10
Trade:
σAs 6.0
Equilibrium (labor markets):
εl 0.10
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